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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
!'Ia i utiff and Respond c nt, 
v. 
LCCY C. CALLISTER, Individually 
and as Executrix of the Estate of 
~\.lfred Cyril Callister, Deceased, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
~TATE.\IENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
10013 
Omitting the various innuendos and arguments con-
tained in appellant's statement of facts, a simple state-
mPnt follows. \Y e :-;hall, as did appellant, refer to 
plaintiff a~ Y era, and defendant as Lucy. 
Yera wa~ fonnerly the wife of Dr. Callister. She 
obtained a divorce decree which awarded alimony. As 
soon a~ thP diYoreP wa:-; final Dr. Callister married Lucy. 
Alimony becmne delinquent. He made gifts to Lucy of 
:'toek~ valued in excess of $90,000 telling her that the 
transfers were made for the purpose of removing these 
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stocks from his name and placing them beyond the access 
of Vera. (R. 51) At the time of his death, Dr. Callister 
owed Vera $11,150.00 together with accrued interest. 
(R. 40) 
Lucy acted as executrix of the doctor's estate. She 
filed a probate inventory showing assets of $809.12. (R. 
8'6) Claims were filed in the total amount of $14,874.43. 
(R. 79, 80, 87) Lucy allowed and paid all claims except 
Vera's by using the meager assets she had inventoried in 
the estate and by advancing some funds she claimed as 
her own. She rejected Vera's claim. 
Vera filed an action to establish her claim against 
the estate and to establish that the stock transfers were 
in fraud of creditors. Lucy, while executrix, did not 
disclose any information available to her tending to 
show an intent by the doctor to defraud Vera as a credi-
tor. Not only did Lucy fail to disclose any such informa-
tion, she also, as executrix, denied Vera's pleading, 
which alleged that the doctor intended by the transfer of 
stock to hinder, delay or defraud her as a creditor. 
Vera compromised her claim for $4000 because she 
had little evidence to establish the doctor's fradulent 
intent. (R. 52-13) A release, stipulation and judgment 
of dismissal were executed and Vera's attorney closed 
his file. (R. 52-25) 
Six months later, Llewellyn Thomas, an attorney 
for the Utah state tax commission came to Vera's attor-
ney, while conducting an investigation regarding inheri-
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tan('t' taxPH due in the doctor's estate. (R. 5:2-21) 
'rhomas asked \'t•ra·~ attorney why Vera had settled her 
('!aim. HP Hhowed Vt>ra's attorney an affidavit by Lucy 
a~~Prting to the tax conunission the very thing that 
Luey, aH Pxecutrix, had so staunchly denied, namely, 
that thP transfer of stock was made for the purpose of 
defrauding the creditor Vera. (R. 51) The pertinent 
part of this affidavit is 
"That her husband told her that the trans-
fers were 1nade for the purpose of removing these 
stocks from his name and placing them beyond 
access of his former wife, Vera Callister, to 
whmn the doctor owed certain monies for arrear-
ages in an alilnony judgment which she had 
against hiln ; 
•'That the doctor was very bitter about hav-
ing to pay this alimony because he felt that his 
for1uer wife had received more than her fair 
share of the propery upon their divorce;" 
This change of position, whereby the executrix later 
asserted that the stocktransfer was in fraud of creditors 
(and consequently was not in contemplation of death) 
resulted in a tax saving of $4286.60. (R.128) 
.Alter Lucy's settlement with the tax commiSSion, 
she filed her final account with the probate court and 
p~titioned for approval of her skillfully contrived ad-
ministration and for her discharge from her fiduciary 
duties. (R. 14:1) Yera obejcted thereto and brought the 
present suit alleging three causes of action; first, that 
Lucy was unjustly enriehed, seeond, that she should hold 
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the stocks as constructive trustee and third, that be-
cause of concealment from the court and from Vera of 
the fact that the doctor had told her that the transfers 
of stock were made to defraud Vera, the release, stipu-
lation and judgment of dismissal should be set aside and 
she should be allowed to litigate her claim. 
The court granted a summary judgment against Lucy 
on the third cause of action because she had breached 
her duties as a court official, which "came ahead of any 
right she had as an heir of transferee". (R. 53) The 
court said she had a duty "to the court as well as to the 
creditors" to disclose facts relating to fraudulent trans-
fers to herself, and to include such property as estate 
assets. (R. 56) 
ARGUME,NT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT MAY SET ASIDE A JUDGMENT FOR ANY 
REASON JUSTIFYING RELIEF INCLUDING FRAUD UPON 
THE COURT. 
·Judge Ellett was understandably shocked by his 
court official's playing "fast and loose" in estate matters. 
He exercised his sound discretion in setting the judg-
ment aside because of the acts of a court official, where-
by she took advantage of her position, not only by 
concealing information, which she had a duty to disclose, 
but also by denying fraudulent intent on the part of Dr. 
Callister and then later asserting such a fraudulent in-
tent, both to her personal benefit. 
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An independPnt action was c01mnenced to set the 
judgment of dismissal aside under Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. 
Rule 60(b) provides, in part, that 
.. rehe court may in the furtherance of justice 
rPliPVP a party ... fr01n a final judgment ... for 
tlw following reasons: ... 
.. ( 7) Any other reason justifying relief fr01n 
thP operation of the judgment ... This rule does 
not limit the power of a court ... to set aside a 
judg1nent for fraud upon the court ... " 
Under 60(b) (7) Judge Ellett was justified in setting 
thP judg1nent aside for 1nany reasons other than fraud, 
including such reasons as (a) He did not want an offi-
et~r of the court to profit by her position at the expense 
of a creditor of the estate. (b) He wanted an officer of 
his court to fully disclose relevant facts to those persons 
to whmn she had a duty of trust. (c) He wanted an 
officer of his court to fully disclose relevant facts to 
the court itself. (d) He did not want an officer of his 
court to engage in sharp practice because the act of the 
officer is, in fact, an act of the court, and the public in 
general, and creditors of estates in particular, are en-
titled to expect and receive fair and iinpartial treatment 
from the court and its officials in the probate of an 
estate. 
Likewise, Judge Ellett felt there was "fraud upon 
the court." Fraud upon the court may arise when a court 
official violates a duty to deal with the court with in-
tegrity and honesty. 
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" 'Fraud upon the court' should, ·we believe, 
embrace only that species of fraud which does, or 
attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud 
perpetrated by officers of the court so that the 
judicial machinery can not perforn1 in the usual 
manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that 
are presented for adjudication." 7 Moore's Fed-
eral Practice, Par. 60.33. 
'The court was fully justified in setting aside the 
judgment, under Rule 60(b), for fraud upon the court 
or any other reason justifying relief. The bulk of the 
arguments in appellant's brief are therefore inapplicable. 
We discuss their arguments in the order presented 
in appellant's brief. 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS FRAUD UPON THE PLAINTIFF. 
Lucy argues that the specific intent of Dr. Callister 
to defraud Vera might be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence of the surrounding circumstances, rather than by 
showing direct statements by the doctor showing his 
intent. She quotes an inapplicable rule, about direct 
testimony by a transferor, to the effect the transferor's 
direct testimony denying his fraudulent intent might 
not be worthy of belief. Here, we have neither direct 
testimony (Dr. Callister is deceased) nor do we have 
denial of fraudulent intent, but rather a declaration 
against interest admitting the fraudulent intent. 
·This is not only a declaration against interest, which 
in and of itself is sufficient to be an exception to the 
hearsay rule, but is an admission by Lucy's predecessor 
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privity with him. Contrary to appellant's assertion that 
Dr. Calli~ter'~ stateinent of his fraudulent intent would 
not hP admissible because the statement was Inade sub-
~l'qtwnt to the transfer~, the general rule of law, which 
has been ~l't forth in Inany Utah cases, is to the effect 
that: 
"When intent is a umterial ele1nent of a dis-
puted fact, declarations of a decedent made after, 
as well as before, an alleged act that indicate 
the intent with which he performed the act, are 
adn1issible." 
20 Am. J ur. :mvidence, Par. 585 (Cun1ulative Suppl.) 
Kelly t:. Bank of America Nat. T. & Sav' gs Association, 
11~ Cal. App. 2d 388, 246 P2d 92, 34 ALR 2d 678. Anno-
tation 34 ALR 2d 588. Mower v. Mower (1924) 64 Utah 
:2ti0, ~28 P 911; Chamberlain v. Larson (1934) 83 Utah 
-t~O, :2~) P2d 355; Stanley v. Stanley (1939) 97 Utah 5~20, 
94 P2d 465; Fin:;t Security Bank v. Burgi (1952) 122 Utah 
445, :251 P2d 297. 
Lucy's contention that the doctor's statement would 
not be adlnissible in evidence is therefore erroneous. 
Lucy argues that Y era should have proved her case 
by circmnstantial evidence, and that she was therefore 
not har1ned by Lucy's conceahnent of facts in violation 
of her fiduciary duty of full disclosure. Declarations 
by the transferor are a part of the circumstantial evi-
dence. 1ll ower L JI ower, 64 1Ttah 260, 228 P 911, 914. 
Furtherinore, Lucy would have to concede that a case 
without an outright admission by Dr. Callister of his 
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fraudulent intent would be a weaker case than one based 
upon such an admission. Vera was, therefore, hanned by 
conceahnent of such statement because the weakness of a 
case induces its settlement for a small mnount. 
iLucy argues the admission of fraudulent intent by 
the doctor was a privileged communication by one spouse 
to another, but Lucy had no quahns about waiving the 
"privilege" when it was to her advantage to disclose the 
communication to the tax commision. She had the duty 
to disclose the same statement to a creditor in the pro-
bate proceeding so long as she was executrix, and she 
could only avoid such a duty by either declining to act 
or by resigning as executrix, neither of which would she 
do. It would be most peculiar to permit a fiduciary to 
breach her duty of full disclosure and justify such breach 
on the grounds that she had a personal privilege. More 
importantly, communications between husband and wife 
while engaged in the perpetration of a fraud are not 
privileged. 58 .A.m. Jur. Witnesses, par. 398. 
It is amazing to note that Lucy next asserts, "Lucy 
presently contends, and has contended all along, that 
the transfers weren't made with intent to defraud Vera." 
(Appellant's brief, page 19). This is a remarkable state-
ment in light of the assertion to the tax commission that 
the doctor told her the transfers were made for the 
purpose of placing the stock beyond the access of Vera; 
which statement was submitted to the tax commission 
for the purpose of establishing that the transfers were 
not in contemplation of death. 
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Lucy next argues that a litigant generally has no 
duty to disclose facts helpful to the opposition. This is 
conceded, and the cases cited by Lucy on the point are 
8otmd, but they are inapplicable because there is no 
fiduciary relationship involved in those cited cases. Vera 
concedes that if there were no fiduciary duty of full 
disclosure, then failure to disclose would not be fraudu-
lent, but Vera does not agree that it is either "pre-
posterous'' or "unreasonable" that Vera should expect 
a full diselosure from the executrix. Lucy had a duty 
of full disclosure when Vera asserted her claim, which 
duty continued after Lucy denied the claim and suit was 
brought against her. 
In discussing the duties of an administrator, Ban-
croft says: 
"Once appointed and acting, the representa-
tive becon1es as to the heirs and devisees, a fidu-
ciary, and practically a trustee in n1any respects, 
subject to the burden of dealing with a fairness 
which is the settled concomitant of such rela-
tionship, ... 
"Thus the personal representative of a de-
cedent occupies a dual position; he stands in a 
fiduciary relationship to the creditors and heirs 
of the deceased, and at the same time he has 
obligations as an officer of the court which ap-
pointed him. 
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2 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd Ed. Pars. 332, 
337. 
"Crosby was also the administrator or rnana-
ger of the estate in Utah. As administrator he 
had the duty to make full disclosure of all rnatters 
and information regarding the estate. It is not 
unlike a partnership where one partner manages 
the business. He must make full disclosure of his 
acts and the state of the business and render a 
correct accounting." In re Blodgett's Estate, 93 
Utah 1, 70 P2d 742, 749. 
Justice Cardozo in the case of Meinhard v. Salmon, 
249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545, 62 A.L.R. 1, quoted in 2 
Scott on Trusts, p. 909, said: 
"Many forms of conduct permissible in a 
workaday world for those acting at arm's length, 
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A 
trustee is held to something stricter than the 
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, 
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, 
is then the standard of behavior. As to this there 
has developed a tradition that is unending and 
inveterate. rncompromising rigidity has been the 
attitudes of courts of equity when petitioned to 
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 
'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. 
Only thus had the level of conduct for fiduciaries 
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by 
the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by 
any judgment of this court." 
In Burns v. Skogstad, 69 Idaho 227, 206 Pac. 2d 
765, 769, in a case remarkably close to the case at bar, 
the Court said: 
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" ..• it wa~ the duty of the executor in dealing 
with t hP~P legatees to 1nake a full disclosure of 
all n·lPvant fact~ and to treat them with utmost 
franktw~~. :~ Bogart Tntsts and Trustees, Sec. 
-1:93 and 5-1-1. ~ehP burden was upon the defendants 
to show that this duty was performed. This the 
defendants have not done. The record is silent as 
to what disclosures, if any, 'vere 1nade by the 
Pxecutor as to the condition, or value of the 
P~tah·, or a~ to the interests of the legatees 
therein.'' 
HUtnwst fairness and good faith is required of an 
executor with those whom he purports to represent." 33 
C .. J .S. 1102, Sec. 1-12, note 41. The executor primarily 
represents the creditors of the estate of the decedent and 
secondarily the heirs. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. 
Farmers & Lllechanics Bank, 173 F. 390; In re Weinberg's 
Estate, :296 N.Y.S.7, 162 Misc. 867. A trust relation exists 
between the executor and the creditors, especially if the 
estate i::; insolvent. Reconstntction Finance Corp. v. Lee, 
:!90 ~lich. 328, :287 N.W. 757. 
It i::; alway::; held to be actual fraud for an executor 
to take for his own benefit a position in which his per-
sonal intere::;t will conflict with his primary duty to 
creditors. Sclzolz r. llazard, 68 Colo. 343, 191 Pac. 123; 
:2 Bancroft's Probate Pt·actice 648, Sec. 339. fVoodson v. 
Raynolds, -!:2 X .~l. 161, 76 P2d 3-1. 
Lucy as executrLx had a legal duty to disclose to 
Yera, a::-; a creditor, facts in Lucy's knowledge regarding 
the assets of the estate and fraudulent transfers by the 
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decedent. The probate inventory filed by Lucy (R. 85) 
and the inheritance tax inventory (R. 100) were half 
truths. 2 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 657 Sec. 506, 
states : "If property was conveyed by the decedent in his 
lifetime in fraud of creditors and the assets are insuffi-
cient to pay his debts, such property may be recovered in 
most states in an action by the representative and must 
be inventoried although it is an 'asset' only for the pay-
ment of debts." (emphasis ours). Adams v. Prather, 176 
Cal. 33, 167 P. 534. 
In Baker v. Baker, 24 'Tenn. App. 220, 142 S.W. 2d 
737, the court states : 
"'The executor is bound to disclose material 
facts within his knowledge wherein the benefici-
ary's interest is to be affected by a transaction 
with the executor, concealment by the executor 
being fraudulent in law and furnishing basis for 
equitable relief." 
S.ee 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jtttrisprudence, 8ec. 902. 
In re Dryden's Estate, 155 Neb. 552, 52 N.W. 2d 734, 
holds that "1The personal representative of an estate and 
his attorney are officers of the court and are fiduciaries 
in their relation to the estate of the deceased and the 
persons interested therein," and that failure of the exec-
utor and his attorney to disclose facts material to such 
interested persons to protect their interests is extrinsic 
fraud requiring equitable relief. This duty of disclosure 
by an executor was again spelled out in Purinton v. 
Dyson, 8 Cal. 2d 322, 65 P.2d 777, 113 A.L.R. 1230. 
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Ltwy·~ failtuP to fully disclose was not only a breach 
of Juty as a fiduciary. It was the 1neans of reaping a 
benefit for Ltu·y pPrsonall~·. ~lw was an officer of the 
<·ourt, who in tlw language of our court in Weyant v. 
l"lali Sur . ... ~ Tr. Co .. 5-I- Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.L.R. 
1119, '"used the <·onrt as an instru1nent to gain her own 
Pnd." /11 n· Sullirau·,..,. Estate, 51 Ariz. 483, 78 P.2d 132, 
i~ a east> involving failure of an executor to disclose 
material fads to <'reditors. The court said: 
.. When a party who speaks falsely or refuses 
to speak truly occupies a fiduciary relation to-
ward an injured party so that it is his duty to 
state all the facts, and if further he profits by 
his own fraudulent conduct, the conduct will 
justify equity in intervening even in a collateral 
proceedings whether the fraud be considered ex-
trinsic or intrinsic." 
Lucy argues that there was no reliance. The test of 
reliancL' in a case of conceahnent is whether or not Vera 
would have adPd differently had there been a disclosure. 
:>7 C.J.S. Froud, par. 29. Vera testified that although 
she would have been guided by counsel, had the state-
ment by Dr. Callister been disclosed to her, she would 
not han• ~Pttled. (R-52-53) Furthermore, Vera's lawyer 
said that he would not have advised settlement had the 
statPment by Dr. Callister as to his fraudulent intent 
been disclosed by Lucy. (R-52-26) 
Lucy cites Cultuu r. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351, 23 P.16, 
as authority as to when a fiduciary's duty of disclosure 
terminates. That case holds that the fiduciary duty con-
tinues so long as the relationship continues. Lucy hasn't 
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yet resigned as executrix and still has the duty of full 
disclosure. In none of the cases cited by Lucy is the 
fiduciary exonerated from an original duty to disclose 
by virtue of the fact that a suit is pending to establish 
the very thing concealed. 
Lucy asserts that this was an arm's-length trans-
action because Vera had counsel. Vera's counsel was 
duped along with Vera. He would not have advised com-
promising Vera's claim had Lucy disclosed facts known 
to her. (R-52-26) 
'There was a fiduciary duty of accounting for assets 
and of full disclosure and a breach of said duties, reliance 
on which changed Vera's course of conduct. 
POINT III. 
LUCY'S FRAUD WAS EX'TRINSIC. 
·The fraud is stated by Lucy to be intrinsic and not 
the type which is the basis for setting aside a judgment 
which must be extrinsic. 1The distinction between intrin-
sic and extrinsic fraud has been criticized as being 
largely a matter of semantics; but even if the distinction 
is a valid one, where a fiduciary has a duty to make a 
full and fair disclosure to the adverse party of relevant 
and material facts, a failure to do so is extrinsic fraud 
and is the basis for setting aside a judgment. 7 Moore's 
Federal Practice, 60.37, footnote 22. Where testamentary 
trustees had a duty to disclose to beneficiaries their 
self dealing, the trustees' failure to disclose was held 
to be both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud and an order 
vacating a judgment was affirmed. Re Enger, 225 Minn. 
229, 30 NW 2d 694, 1 ALR 2d 1048. An order setting 
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a:-;idt· a judgment wa:-; held to be proper where a guardian 
ohtuint•(l a rdPaHP and discharge frmn his wards. The 
I'Oill't :-;aid, "If tlt~·n· wa~ fraud in obtaining the re-
lt·a:-;t·, tlti:-; fraud was t•t•rtainly extrinsic to the judg-
HH·nt." l)u rk r. Park, 1~3 Fed 2d 370, 37~. 
l1\11'th1·nnun•, if there is fraud upon the court as 
lwn·. tltt· vPry language partially quoted by Lucy in 
her ln·ipf from Hauer 'C. llauer, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P2d 
~177, .->7S-~), ~how~ that the judgment should be set aside 
a~ lwing t>xtrin:-;ic fraud. The court said: 
"lt i~ smneti1nes said that when a judgment 
is attacked collaterally on the ground that it was 
obtained by fraud or deceit it will be set aside 
onlv for extrinsic fraud. But we are in accord 
with the indicators in the Restatement of J udg-
ments that this is too limited. It seems more 
reali~tie to ~a~~ that when it appears that the 
proeP~~P~ of justice have been so completely 
thwartPd or distorted as to persuade the court 
that in fairness and good conscience a judg1nent 
should not be permitted to stand, relief should 
be granted. However, inasmuch as the plaintiff 
here see1ns to be relying on the ground of fraud, 
there is a di~tinction which it is necessary to 
point out. ln order to justify granting relief, 
the alleged wrong would have to be of the type 
eharacterized as extrinsic fraud: that is, fraud 
ba~ed on conduct or activities outside of the court 
proceedings the1neslves ; and which is designed 
and has the effect of depriving the other party of 
the opportunity to present his claim or defense. 
This type of fraud, which is regarded as a fraud 
not only upon the opponent, but ttpon the court 
itself, can be accomplished in a number of ways, 
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such as making false statements or representa-
tions to the other party or to witnesses to prevent 
them from contesting the issues; or by that means 
or otherwise preventing the attendance of the 
parties or witnesses; or by destroying or secret-
ing evidence; so that fair trial of the issues is 
effectively prevented." (Emphasis ours). 
The other cases cited by Lucy relating to extrinsic 
and intrinsic fraud are not in point because they do not 
involve a fiduciary's failure to disclose. Lucy seems to 
concede this since she states that concealment is "not 
a basis for setting aside the judgment unless the rela-
tionship between Vera and Lucy was such that there 
was a special duty of disclosure.'' (Appellant's brief, 31). 
Lucy had a special duty of disclosure in that she was 
executrix. 
POINT IV. 
LUCY HAD A FIDUCIARY DUTY OF DISCLOSURE. 
Lucy cites 75-11-14 UCA 1953 providing an execu-
trix need not bring suit to recover property fraudulently 
conveyed unless the creditor pays the costs of suit, but 
Lucy concedes that the statute does not apply to this 
situation, where the executrix herself is the one in pos-
session of the property fraudulently transferred. 
Lucy infers that because a creditor can directly sue 
an executrix when she is a fraudulent transferee, there 
is therefore a recognition of a conflict of interest, and 
Lucy then concludes that "it would be unrealistic to 
expect Lucy to protect Vera's claim." (Appellant's brief, 
34). By this Lucy must mean that where there is a con-
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t'lict of intPrl·;.;t, a fiduciary i~ relieved frmn any duty of 
full di~elo~un·. Such i~ not the law and Lucy cites no 
I'H~P~ whi<·h Hupport ::-;twh a proposition. The case of 
f:mmous r. Barto11, 109 Cal. 662, 42 P 303, cited by her 
HH'n~ly holds that where an executrix was the fraudulent 
g-rant''''· it would be useless for a creditor to demand that 
slll' ~UL' herself or furnish costs of such suit. (Paren-
thl'tieally Luey also cites this case as holding that state-
llll•nts by a d<'('l'HHPd husband 1nade after a conveyance 
an· inadmissible. This holding was based on an 1849' 
California statute. California no longer so holds. See 
1\.l'li!J r. Bauk of America Nat. T. & Savings Associa-
tion supra.) 
Luey cmnplains that no effort was 1nade by Vera to 
remove her as executrix. Her reasoning 1nust be that 
\"era must assmne that Lucy will not properly discharge 
her duties, including that of full disclosure. Lucy, not 
\\•ra, knew that Dr. Callister had stated his fraudulent 
intent. Only Luey knew that she was concealing informa-
tion. \.era had no reason to petition to remove Lucy 
since ~lw had no indication that Lucy was concealing 
information until she learned of the affidavit Lucy filed 
with the tax conuni~Hion. Surely, Lucy cannot seriously 
contend that because \~era did not petition to remove 
her from office on the ground that Lucy had a conflict 
of inh•rt>~t. that such inaction protects Lucy from any 
wrongdoing on her part "·hile Lucy held onto said office 
dl':'pitl' her conflict of interest. 
Luey cite~ Borge L·. Traaen, 158 Ore. 454, 75 P2d 
93~), as authority for the proposition that Vera is not a 
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creditor of the estate because she had not reduced her 
claim to judgment and thus the executrix owed no fidu-
ciary duty to her. 'The case does not so hold. 
In the Borge case, a creditor of the deceased filed 
no claim in probate, and after the administratrix, who 
was the wife of the decedent, was discharged upon the 
closing of the estate, the creditor brought suit against 
her, claiming a transfer in fraud of creditors. A de-
murrer was sustained by the lower court and affirmed 
on appeal. The court said that no claim had been filed 
in the estate during the probate, and that because no 
claim was filed, any claim which she might originally 
have had was barred and that she was no longer a 
creditor of the estate. There was no allegation that 
there were any claims filed with the administratrix which 
were not paid. The court said that the administratrix 
did not commit fraud by not inventorying the transferred 
property because it was not in fact a part of the estate 
inasmuch as it was not needed to pay debts. The court 
cited the Oregon statute providing that an administra-
trix should bring an action to recover property trans-
ferred in fraud of creditors when the assets of the estate 
are insufficient to satisfy claims. Since the creditor had 
not filed her claim, and since therefore the estate was 
not insolvent, the administratrix had no duty to inven-
tory the property. ·The obvious distinction between the 
case at bar and the Oregon case, which Lucy ignores, 
is that a claim was filed in our case. 
The Oregon case also states that a direct action 
cannot be taken against the transferee until a judgment 
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has been obtained against the transferor thereby estab-
li8hing that the transferor had an obligation to the 
(·n·ditor, und, until then, an equitable lien cannot be 
iuqHI~t·d on the transferred property. This 1nay have 
bel•n tlu• rule in Oregon in 1938 as well as in some other 
~tate~, but J5-l-15 l~CA 1953, provides, in part, as 
follows: 
":25-1-15. RIGl-lT8 OF CREDITORS WIT'H 
.JlATURED CLAil\1:S. - Where a conveyance 
or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such 
creditor, when his clai1n has matured, may, as 
again~t any person, except a purchaser for fair 
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at 
the tilne of the purchase or one who has derived 
title inllllediately or 1nediately from such a pur-
chaser: 
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obliga-
tion annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy 
his clailu ; or, 
( J) Di~regard the conveyance, and attach, 
or levy execution upon, the property conveyed." 
This statute requires no reduction to judgment, but 
authorizes a direct re1nedy against the transferee. Our 
l'H~l' does not involve any equitable lien in any event. 
l'tah rules relating to a joinder of actions should also 
do away with any requirement of prior judgment. Even 
if a prior judgn1ent wt>re required, Vera does have a 
judgment as to alinwny which is a determination that 
the transferor had an obligation, which would satisfy 
the rational of the Oregon rule, even though not further 
reduced to a judgn1ent as to the amount actually due. 
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Lucy's conclusion that there was no fiduciary re-
lationship is therefore not substantiated. 
Lucy argues that an executri.x has no duty of dis-
closure and cites In re Blodgett's Estate, 93 Utah 1, 70 
P2d 7 42, as authority for the proposition. That case, in 
the very language quoted by Lucy, holds that there is a 
duty of disclosure by an executrix or administratrix 
and that until there is a full disclosure there is a breach 
of duty. The Court said there was no duty to advise, but 
said: 
" ... His duty as administrator went to the 
obligation to take into possession and disclose 
all estate property and all information to those 
interested in the estate as to estate matters, thus 
putting them on the same plane as he was as to 
such information regarding all the assets and 
transactions, but, when that is done, he has per-
formed his duty to a party in regard to whom he 
is in controversy as to their respective interest .... 
"All we need to do is to determine if there 
were reasonable grounds for controversy and, if 
so, whether he furnished her full information as 
executor from which she could decide in their 
controversy as beneficiaries what she would or 
would not do. . . . 
". . . The law is plain that he has his duty 
as trustee to her and as such it must be fully per-
formed." 
The court then found there was full disclosure. 
Our very point is that Lucy did fail to disclose, 
not that there was any duty or failure to advise. The 
Blodgett case does not even discuss the assertion by 
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Luey that personal dislike hd ween the executrix and a 
ht•net'iciary t•x<·<·tt~P~ the exP<·utrix fr01n her duty of full 
<li~do~nre. 
'rhe ea~t· of Jorgcu8('1/ r. Jorgen8en, 3~ Cal. 2d 13, 
193 I ,:2d 1:2S, 1:~:2, i~ cited by Lucy as authority for the 
proposition that a fiduciary has no duty of full dis-
closure. ln that ea~P the husband asserted his legal con-
clusion in a divorce action that certain property was 
his separate property, rather than cmmnunity property. 
'fhere wa~ no failure on his part to disclose assets . .All 
the court held wa8 that there was no fraud because there 
was no conceahnent of facts, and the husband was en-
titled to assert his legal position without being guilty 
of fraud, with which we agree. There was not even an 
all('gation that facts concerning the separate or com-
munity property were known to the husband and not 
known by the wife or that any such facts were concealed. 
\Yhy Lucy cites this case we can't imagine, because the 
court states the following law: 
.. It is necessary to examine the facts in the 
light of the policy that a party who failed to 
assemble all his evidence at the trial should not 
be privileged -to relitigate a case, as well as the 
policy pennitting a party to seek relief from a 
judg1nent entered in a proceeding in which he 
was deprived of a fair opportunity fully to pre-
sent his case. 
"The latter policy applies when a party's ad-
versary. in violation of a duty arising from a 
trust or confidential relation, has concealed from 
him facts essential to the protection of his rights, 
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even though such facts concerned issues involved 
in the case in whieh the judgment was entered. 
''The failure to perform the duty to speak or make 
disclosures which rests upon one because of a 
trust or confidential relation is obviously a fraud, 
for which equity may relieve from a judgment 
thereby obtained, even though the breach of duty 
occurs during a judicial proceeding and involves 
false testimony, and this is true whether such 
fraud be regarded as extrinsic or as an exception 
to the extrinsic fraud rule.' (Citing authority) In 
this state equitable relief has been granted from 
final judgments settling the accounts of guard-
ians, administrators, or executors who withheld 
information that would have enabled the bene-
ficiaries to attack the accounts. (Citing authority) 
The same principle applies to decrees distribut-
ing the estate of a decedent adversely to the rights 
of beneficiaries who have been precluded from 
pursuing their rights by concealment of facts by 
the fiduciary. (Citing authority)" 
Lucy contends that if Lucy had not been executrix 
and another executrix had sued her to recover the prop-
erty fraudulently conveyed, she would have had no 
fiduciary duty of disclosure. We see no relevancy to 
such argument because she did assume the duties of 
an executrix and must discharge them. 
POINT V. 
THERE WERE NO TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT. 
Lucy argues that there was a triable issue of fact 
as to reliance. Where a false representation has been 
made, which, from its nature, might induce another 
to act, there is a presumption that there was a reliance 
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on thP n·presentation. ~-!- Am. J ur. :.B-,raud and Deceit, 
Par. ~fi-t. Not only was there this presu1nption, but 
th•·n· WPl'P tl~t· dP1wsitions of both Vera and her counsel 
wlwrPiu \~Pra testified that she would not have settled 
had Luey told her of the stateinent by Dr. Callister of 
hi~ fraudulent intent (R-52-53), and Vera's counsel testi-
fit•d that he would not have advised settlement had he 
known of tht• statmnent (R-52-26). Furthermore, there 
wu~ not only a conceahnent by the fiduciary but also an 
t>xprP~~ denial of Dr. Callister's intent when Lucy knew 
thP doctor had divulged a fraudulent intent (R-28). Had 
there been no such denial there would have been no 
comprolllise. 
Luey also argues that there was an issue as to 
whether or not the state1nent by Dr. Callister was ma-
terial. lt wa~ the key to the whole question of his intent. 
Luey argues that she had no intention to mislead. 
This is inconceivable. 
Lucy next presents the ingenious argument that 
Y era may be estopped because she did not instantly bring 
::;nit, but pern1itted Lucy to continue to assert to the tax 
t'Ollnnission that Dr. Callister had an intent to defraud 
creditors. Lucy does not point out what detriment she 
conet>ivably could have suffered nor what misrepres~nta­
tion Vera made which could be the basis of estoppel. 
Lucy contends that the timeliness of an action to 
::'L't aside a judg1nent is a matter of fact which a Court 
on a motion for SUllllnary judgment could not decide. 
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Although admittedly the timeliness of bringing an action 
may involve questions of fact as well as law, when 
there is no genuine issue as to the facts involved, as 
here, then a Court on a motion for summary judgment 
should decide the question. There is no genuine issue 
as to the length of time involved in filing the suit after 
discovery of the fraud, nor as to possibility of prejudice 
to Lucy as a result of any delay, nor as to actual injury 
because of delay, nor as to rights of third parties, all 
of which are the "issues of fact" affecting the right to 
rescind, according to the authority cited by Lucy. Brown 
v. Hassens, 212 Ore. 246, 319 P2d 929. Judge Ellett 
properly ruled that there was no genuine issue of fact, 
which ruling must have been based upon the pleadings, 
the depositions and statement of counsel. A trial court 
would be considering no facts other than those before 
Judge Ellett. 
A comparable time for rescision of 3 months was 
recently held timely by this count in Elder v. Clawson, 
....... Utah ...... , 384 P2d 802. 
Lucy argues that Vera has unclean hands, because 
her counsel, pursuant to the pretrial court's suggestion, 
pointed out to Lucy's counsel inheritance tax savings 
that would result if it were conceded that Dr. Callister 
had an intent to defraud creditors, which would rebutt 
an intent to make a gift in contemplation of death. There 
was no "invitation" to do anything. Vera's suggestion 
was only pointing out the benefits to the estate tax wise, 
and hence to Lucy personally, of the recognition of 
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Yt·ra's clain1 (R-52-12). It was Lucy, not Vera, who was 
carrying water on both shoulders. Evidence of the doc-
tor'H irltt•nt was available to Lucy, not Vera. 
POINT VI. 
A NEW ACTION IS NOT NECESSARY. 
Rule 60(b) URCP clearly authorizes that a judg-
ment be set aside either by motion or by independent 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite Lucy's efforts to make it appear that she, 
the executrix, had not sinned but, in fact, had been sinned 
against, this is simply a case in which there was sharp 
practice by an executrix to her own financial advantage, 
which Judge Ellett said he would not allow, because 
officers of the court are expected to uphold the dignity 
and honor of the cou.rt. We submit that he should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES W. BELESS, JR., and 
BRAYTON, LO\VE & HURLEY 
JOHN W. LOWE. 
1001 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
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